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In a fundamental contribution, Prescott and Townsend (1984) have shown that the existence and efficiency properties of Walrasian equilibria extend to economies with moral hazard and exclusive contracts. Recently, in this Journal, Bennardo and Chiappori (2003) have argued that Walrasian equilibria may (robustly) fail to exist when the class of moral hazard economies in Prescott and Townsend's work is generalized to allow for aggregate, in addition to idiosyncratic, uncertainty, if preferences are nonseparable in consumption and effort. In this comment, we show that such a claim is incorrect and that the existence and efficiency properties of Walrasian equilibria remain valid in the setup considered by Bennardo and Chiappori. We briefly describe the moral hazard economy considered by Bennardo and Chiappori (2003) . There is a continuum of ex ante identical individuals with measure one and a single consumption good. Individuals are affected by both an aggregate and an idiosyncratic endowment shock. Specifically, there are two aggregate states, , and two
After completing the first version of this comment (September 2003), we became aware of a paper (Rustichini and Siconolfi 2003) in which a point similar to ours is made. We wish to thank the editor, Robert Shimer, and two anonymous referees for very helpful comments. Financial support from the Ministry for University and Research (project 2005135328_002) shocks are independently and identically distributed across individuals and are independent of the aggregate shock. The probability of each aggregate state s is exogenous and is denoted by l and for 1 Ϫ l s p and 2, respectively. On the other hand, the probability of idiosyncratic 1 state j depends on an effort e supplied by the individual prior to the realization of uncertainty (both aggregate and idiosyncratic). Effort can be high or low; the set of effort levels is . Higher effort raises E { {e , e } l h the probability of the high-endowment idiosyncratic state. Let the probability of state be when effort is high and
when effort is low. While the realization of uncertainty is publicly P observable, an individual's effort is not.
Individuals have von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences described by the (state-independent) Bernoulli utility function .
is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, u(7, e) and strictly concave with . Effort is costly, so lim Ѩu(c, e)/Ѩc p ϱ u (c, cr0 for all .
To establish our result, we first need to briefly lay out the structure of markets.
Commodities.-The commodities traded are insurance contracts. An insurance contract specifies an effort level and a bundle of state-contingent net trades. This specification is allowed to be random. As in Prescott and Townsend (1984) , the set of possible consumption levels in any state is assumed to be a finite set with n elements, and maximal C O ᑬ ϩ element . When aggregate state s is realized, the set of posj c k max y s,j s sible net trades (contingent on the two idiosyncratic states) is then . An insurance contract is described as a pair
, where is a probability measure on the finite set , given
The terms are probability weights on triples of net ᑬ ϩ denotes the commodity space.
The interpretation of x is as follows. First, a lottery prescribes an effort 1 An equivalent (though slightly more involved) analysis can be carried out when C is an infinite set (e.g., ), and the measure space is then endowed with
ϩ s the weak-star topology (see, e.g., Jerez 2005). Our results extend to that case as well as to the case in which there is an arbitrary number of consumption goods and states (see also Rustichini and Siconolfi 2003) .
level e for the individual. This lottery is given by the marginal of with x s respect to e. Remember that effort is chosen prior to the realization of s, so this marginal must be independent of s, as stated in the following condition:
Thus effort e is prescribed with probability . Conditional on e, a second x e lottery specifies the individual's net trades in the two idiosyncratic states , for every aggregate state s. This lottery is described by the prob-
effort is private information, the effort specification has to be understood as a prescription, which to be effective must satisfy appropriate incentive constraints (see below). Conditional on the realization of aggregate state s, the expected utility of an individual who exerts effort e and realizes net trades is
The expected utility from a contract x is then
The incentive compatibility constraints require that, whenever x prescribes effort e, individuals prefer e rather than deviating to . It is e immediate to verify that the incentive compatibility constraints can be equivalently written as follows:
for all e, . e E Admissible trades.-Since trades are assumed to be observable, any restriction on trades can be imposed. Following Prescott and Townsend (1984) , the set of contracts available for trade to any individual (with X some abuse of language, her consumption set) is the set of incentivecompatible contracts, that is, the set of vectors satis- A contract x satisfies the economy's resource constraints if the total net use of resources of such a contract is nonpositive in both aggregate states:
Incentive efficient allocations.-A (symmetric) allocation x is incentive efficient if it maximizes the individual expected utility in the set of feasible allocations:
s s
Problem (5) is a standard (finite-dimensional) linear program, with a nonempty feasible set. 2 Hence, an optimal solution exists. Note that the feasible set is convex (i.e., if contracts x and satisfy the incentive x compatibility and resource constraints, so does any convex combination of these contracts).
Prices.-Prices are linear on the individuals' consumption set, that is, are linear in the probabilities. A price system is an element p p (p , 1 , where . The cost of a commodity 
1 2 s s
Firms can offer any set of contracts as long as the total net payments required by the contracts offered are self-financing. The law of large numbers allows us to write the self-financing constraint in expected terms in each aggregate state. Since Y displays constant returns to scale, profits are zero in equilibrium and there is no loss of generality in assuming that there is a single firm.
Definition.
A competitive equilibrium is a triple (x*, n*; p*) such that (i) maximizes over the set
, (ii) n* maximizes over the set Y, and (iii) {x X : p* 7 x ≤ 0} p* 7 n markets clear, or . x* p n* Condition i requires to yield the highest utility to individuals among x* all admissible and budget-feasible contracts, and condition ii says that n* is the profit-maximizing choice of the firm. Finally, condition iii says that aggregate demand for contracts by individuals equals supply by firms.
We now show that a competitive equilibrium always exists (in contrast to proposition 5 of Bennardo and Chiappori [2003] ).
Theorem 1. A competitive equilibrium exists. In particular, any (symmetric) incentive-efficient allocation can be supported as a competitive equilibrium.
Proof. It is immediate to verify (see also lemma 3 in Bennardo and Chiappori [2003] ) that, because Y displays constant returns to scale, equilibrium prices are such that, for each , 2, s p 1 for some ; that is, in each state s the price of net trades
with effort e must be either actuarially fair (proportional to the expected use of resources) or zero. The rest of the proof relies on a constructive argument: for any solution of the planner's problem (5), we find prices satisfying (8) that E x support as a competitive equilibrium. E x We first prove that at the resource constraint must bind at least in E x one state s. Suppose that both constraints were slack. Let be a deterl x ministic contract specifying low effort and maximal consumption with c probability one (regardless of the realization of s and j). Contract is l x incentive compatible ( ) and strictly preferred to by the indil Ē
x X x vidual. Hence, so is any convex combination of and :
. For a sufficiently small, also satisfies the
cannot be a solution to (5).
3 E x Consider then the case in which at the resource constraint does E x not bind in one state, say . This is the case analyzed in proposition s p 1 3 In general, any convex combination of a feasible contract x and is strictly preferred l x to x, so there is local nonsatiation within the set of feasible allocations. The reason is that deterministic contract , which gives maximal utility in the consumption set , is not lx X feasible (i.e., ).
j c k max y s,j s 5 of Bennardo and Chiappori (2003) . 4 We claim that, when and b p 0 1 , the prices in (8) 
2 2
It is then immediate to see that is a solution to this problem. Since E x the resource constraint in does not bind in the planner's problem
is a local maximum of (9). Furthermore, the fact that the ob-E x jective function is linear and the feasible set is convex in (9) implies that is also a global maximum by the local-global theorem (Intriligator E x 1971, 75) .
When the firm faces the prices in (8) with and , profits b p 0 b p 1 1 2 are . So (7) implies for all . Clearly, p* 7 n p r 7 n p * 7 n ≤ 0 n Y x (proposition 4) and show that there is an open set of economies that satisfy them. Intuitively, if consumption and leisure are complements and the marginal utility of consumption decreases fast enough with effort, there is a limit to the level of consumption such that agents are still willing to provide high effort. Hence, when the aggregate endowment in is high enough, part of the aggregate endowment will not be consumed s p 1 in that state.
functions of [5] and [9] have the same form). The rest of the argument is identical. QED Remark 1. In equilibrium, aggregate consumption is lower than the aggregate endowment in the high-endowment state (i.e., there s p 1 are resources not utilized in that state). However, there is no incentivecompatible and budget-feasible contract that provides the consumer a higher utility than by allowing her to consume additional resources E x when is realized. This claim is in contrast with the one in the s p 1 proof of lemma 4 in Bennardo and Chiappori (2003) . The authors argue that, if the price associated with consumption in state 1 were zero regardless of the effort level, the consumer could do better by buying a different contract , where specifies low effort and a very high level x x 1 of consumption with probability one, whatever the idiosyncratic state. Since is clearly not feasible, Bennardo and Chiappori concluded that x could not be zero at an equilibrium; the nonexistence result p (z , z , e) 1 a b in proposition 5 then relies on such a claim. But this misses an important point: namely, that effort is chosen before the realization of the aggregate state; thus if specifies low effort with probability one, so must x 1 (eq. [2]). While a contract specifying low effort with probability one x 2 can provide a very high level of consumption if the high-endowment state is realized, consumption in the low-endowment state s p 1 s p may have to be rather low. The consumer in fact needs to pay a positive 2 price for the consumption goods received in state 2, and the price can be quite high-and the value of the endowment quite low-in s p 2 when the consumer exerts low effort.
Formally, if (as claimed by Bennardo and Chiappori) is feasible for
